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The FUSE testbed: establishing a microgrid
for smart grid security experiments
E. Xypolytou OVE, J. Fabini, W. Gawlik, T. Zseby
Reliable and efficient energy supply is based not only on local control but also on remote sensor data and measurements, making
communication one of the important components. The increasing threat of possible attacks is the motivation behind the main pur-
pose of the FUSE testbed—an experimental microgrid for smart grid research—to conduct experiments on smart grid security, grid
optimization, stabilization and islanding. This work, after providing an insight of the current state of the art concerning research on
microgrids, describes the FUSE experimental facility as well as first experiments including partial measurement equipment installation
and data collection and analysis.
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Das FUSE Testbed: Aufbau eines Microgrids für Smart Grid-Sicherheitsexperimente.
Eine zuverlässige und effiziente Energieversorgung basiert nicht nur auf einer lokalen Steuerung, sondern auch auf gesammelten
Sensordaten und Messungen an verteilten Standorten. Daher gewinnt die Übertragung von Sensordaten mittels geeigneter Kommu-
nikationsnetze an Bedeutung. Die damit zunehmende Bedrohung durch mögliche Angriffe ist einer der Hauptgründe für den Aufbau
des FUSE Testbeds – ein experimentelles Microgrid für Smart Grid Forschung. Mit dem FUSE Testbed sollen Experimente im Bereich
Smart Grid Sicherheit, Netzoptimierung, Stabilisierung und Inselbetrieb durchgeführt werden. In diesem Artikel wird, aufbauend auf
dem aktuellen Stand der Technik in der Microgrid-Forschung, das FUSE Testbed vorgestellt. Weiters werden erste Versuchsanord-
nungen im FUSE Testbed mit Schwerpunkt Teil-Installation von Messgeräten und Komponenten zur Datenerhebung und -analyse
beschrieben.
Schlüsselwörter: Microgrids; Smart Grid Sicherheit; Energieversorgung; Kommunikationsnetz; Inselbetrieb; PMU; Zeitsynchronisation;
Dezentralisierung; Angriffe; erneuerbare Energie; Versorgungszuverlässigkeit; selbst-organisierende Energienetze
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1. Introduction
The current electricity infrastructure is evolving. Decentralized power
generation demands more sophisticated control methods, Informa-
tion and Communication Technology (ICT) components increase
the risk for cyber-attacks and classical hierarchical top-down struc-
tures tend to be substituted by cell-based architectures, based
on microgrids. A microgrid consists of several distributed genera-
tors as well as loads, storages and information and communica-
tion technology for monitoring and control operations. Through
the Point of Common Coupling (PCC) it can connect to (grid
connected, parallel mode) and disconnect from (islanding, au-
tonomous operation) the main grid [7]. The ability of a microgrid
to separate itself from the main grid and operate autonomously
is very useful in case of faults and disturbances in the main
grid.
In decentralized approaches system-parts, e.g. generators, loads,
storages, microgrids and grid controllers need to communicate with
each other and interact with each other. The next generation grid
is being formed; the smart grid. Major challenges in ensuring a re-
liable and efficient energy supply include, but are not limited to:
the growing complexity of the grid due to the increasing num-
ber of renewable and distributed energy sources, the necessary en-
ergy saving and demand response strategies to optimize the en-
ergy flow, as well as the various components, protocols and sen-
sors involved in the data transfer, protection and control actions.
Communication is a crucial component for a proper and reliable
operation of a smart grid. However, this leads to new vulnera-
bilities due to possible attacks. In order to investigate attack sce-
narios and their impact on grid operation and control actions,
an experimental microgrid facility is being established at the TU
Wien for research on Future Self-Organizing Energy Networks (FUSE,
https://fuse.project.tuwien.ac.at/).
2. FUSE goals
The FUSE project’s main goal is to support the investigation of smart
grid research questions by experiments in a real testbed with mi-
crogrid components. The project focuses on research questions on
decentralized grid structures that consist of interconnections of mi-
crogrids. Microgrids are the key components in decentralized grid
topologies and offer a broad range of opportunities for a flexi-
ble grid operation, which ideally uses self-organization to react to
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Fig. 1. FUSE objectives
changing boundary conditions. Nevertheless, self-organization re-
quires situational awareness. Internal microgrid operation as well as
the controlled interconnection of microgrids is challenging regard-
ing supervision and control. Expertise in both fields, i.e. in energy
and communication, is required to address those challenges.
The FUSE project has its focus on the following key research as-
pects:
• Intra-Microgrid Management: Exploration of methods for micro-
grid self-management (stabilization, optimization) based on data
collection and situation-dependent decision processes.
• Inter-Microgrid Management: Investigation of methods to au-
tonomously control the interactions in a grid of microgrids, which
includes processes for situation-dependent decisions regarding in-
terconnections and islanding options.
• Microgrid Security: Investigation of security methods to prevent,
detect and mitigate attacks as basis for self-protection functions
in intra- and inter-microgrid communication.
Future challenges in smart grid technologies require experts famil-
iar with both, the energy and the communication domain. There-
fore, besides the scientific objectives of the project it is also planned
to exploit data and infrastructure in research-oriented teaching and
establish research and teaching resources that can be shared with
others (Fig. 1).
3. State of the art: microgrids and grid monitoring
A microgrid, as already mentioned, is an energy system that is con-
nected to the main grid through one or more Points of Common
Coupling (PCC). It usually consists of several distributed generators
as well as loads, storages and information and communication tech-
nology for monitoring and control operations. A microgrid can op-
erate in two different modes: grid-connected (parallel mode) and is-
landed mode (autonomous operation) [7]. The ability of a microgrid
to separate itself from the main grid and operate autonomously is
very useful in case of faults and disturbances in the main grid. After
normal operation of the main grid has been restored, the microgrid
can be reconnected to it. While detailed simulation models of mi-
crogrid components exist and can be used for analysis and planning
of microgrids, real infrastructure is required, not only to validate the
simulation models, but also to improve them and to allow investiga-
tions of the complex interaction of smart grid components and ICT
infrastructure [8], especially related to advanced methods of micro-
grid control [9–12].
The communication network is a key component for a reliable
and robust power grid. Important information about the status of
the power grid, as well as failures or attacks can be extracted from
measurement data, which is why their correct transmission through
the communication network is of great importance. Measurement
data recorded by metering equipment must not only be accurate
and reliable but also provided in real-time in order to contribute to
diagnostics and control actions. Every power system nowadays is
equipped with SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
systems. Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) [1] support the reading of
unsynchronized measurement values for a specific time interval. The
measurement of complex power flows enables the calculation of
bus voltages as a basis for state estimation.
Recently deployed Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) use
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) to measure voltage phasors di-
rectly. In theory such a WAMS infrastructure can offer an accurate
snapshot of the network state at any point in time without state es-
timation. The deployment of PMUs on one hand increases demands
with respect to the capacity and latency of communication networks
[2]. On the other hand, the ability of PMUs to measure fine gran-
ular time-synchronized information is advantageous for grid man-
agement. PMUs sample the sinusoidal waveforms and estimate a
synchrophasor equivalent of an alternate current waveform, while
using the Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to accurately
timestamp phasor measurements [3–5]. The C37.118.1 standard ad-
dresses the measurement aspects of voltage phasors, frequency, rate
of change of frequency, while the C37.118.2 standard addresses the
communication aspects for data exchange. Analytics and diagnos-
tic applications based on PMU data include phase angle deviations,
oscillation monitoring, voltage stability monitoring, fast frequency
decline, sudden change of active/reactive flows, cascading events,
topology detection and others, whereas control applications may
include microgrid controlling, intentional islanding, and Volt-Var op-
timization [1, 6].
However, in practice, the limited number and high cost of PMUs
result in SCADA measurement data to be mixed with PMU data for
state estimation purposes in today’s systems. In the FUSE network
PMUs will be installed, among other sensors.
4. Overview of the FUSE experimental facility
The FUSE microgrid experimental facility will consist of renewable
generators, among which photovoltaic appliance and wind emula-
tor, storages, controllable loads, sensors and actuators. The FUSE
facility is established within a cooperation of three research groups
and two Institutes of the Faculty of Electrical Engineering at TU
Wien, Austria. Figure 2 depicts the components and structure of
the FUSE microgrid.
4.1 FUSE energy grid
The PV generation will consist of two or three PV appliances with an
individual rating of 1 kWpeak to approximately 10 kWpeak, i.e. ratings
which can be expected for such installations in urban and suburban
grids to be operated as a microgrid in the future. Wind energy con-
version will be emulated with a wind energy emulator that has a
power rating of approximately 25 kW, suitable to represent small
wind turbines under different control regimes. The storage capacity
of the battery storage will also be used for tests for the integration
of charging stations and battery electric vehicles (BEV) into the dis-
tribution grid, and thus will be of a size comparable to those found
in current state of the art over BEV, i.e. 20–30 kWh. Load behavior
of the microgrid will be emulated using an electronically controllable
load in the range of 10 kW to 12 kW. Parallel operation of the mi-
crogrid with the main grid can be either simulated by using a real
time network simulator and a 4 quadrant amplifier or the microgrid
can be directly connected to the existing low voltage grid on site.
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4.2 FUSE ICT architecture
In order to fulfill the goals of the FUSE testbed for microgrid self-
management (stabilization, optimization), situation-dependent de-
cisions regarding interconnections, islanding, detection and mitiga-
tion of attacks, data collection is a necessity. Data from each con-
sumer, producer and storage of the testbed will be recorded by
smart meters. Apart from that, PMUs will be installed for a syn-
chronized and highly accurate measurement of frequency, voltage
and current phasors. The PMUs will have an important role on the
decisions regarding islanding, synchronization of the microgrid with
the main grid and reconnection.
All IP connections between grid components in the FUSE exper-
imental testbed will run over switched 1 Gbit/s Ethernet copper
wires or, alternatively, optical lines to span distances that exceed
the maximum Ethernet range. In order to model more realistic WAN
scenarios, including higher latencies because of the microgrid’s ge-
ographical distribution, a Linux NetEm [13] based WAN emulator
will be tightly integrated with the FUSE ICT network. The emula-
tor features an extendable number of Ethernet interfaces and acts
as an Ethernet bridge, which is why it is fully transparent to the
end systems communicating over IP. Emulator features include sym-
metrical or asymmetrical, deterministic or statistical delay, loss, and
delay variation. Therefore, the testbed will be able to emulate com-
munications with sensors and actuators over typical asymmetrical
access networks like 3G, 4G or VDSL. We expect the communi-
cation delays to be a decisive factor that influences the perfor-
mance of grid control algorithms and limits the achievable grid sta-
bility.
The analysis of grid communications and security aspects is sup-
ported by the ability to accurately capture time-stamped packets on
all WAN emulator ingress and egress interfaces. For the moment,
tcpdump captures can be started remotely on any emulator inter-
face and write the resulting capture files to the WAN emulator file
system. The resulting files are valuable for both, real-time and post-
event analysis. In addition, it is planned to use the resulting data
files as input for control algorithm simulations and for the testing of
anomaly detection algorithms.
4.3 Time synchronization
The main prerequisite for accurate correlation of network events is a
common synchronized time base for all components that generate
events and network traces. FUSE relies on Global Positioning System
(GPS) Pulse per Second (PPS) based time synchronization for accu-
rate clock synchronization of PMUs and the WAN emulator. PMUs
and the WAN emulator use separate, dedicated GPS antennas and
GPS/PPS DSPs for local clock synchronization. Linux-based comput-
ers in the FUSE testbed acquire the accurate GPS/PPS time signal
delivered by Copernicus II DSPs through the computer’s serial RS232
interface and the LinuxPPS kernel driver.
5. Planned experiments
The FUSE testbed provides a highly flexible environment and allows
the possibility to perform a variety of experiments. We describe be-
low three examples of experiments that are already planned in the
project proposal and are significant for testbed requirements and
the testbed design.
Experiment Set 1: grid stability control
In this set of experiments various control algorithms are tested on
failures or attacks that endanger grid stability. It is investigated how
fast failures can be detected and how fast countermeasures (such
as load shedding) can be invoked and if (and how fast) grid stability
can be re-established.
Fig. 2. FUSE experimental facility
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Fig. 3. Live PMU measurements using openPDC for showing voltage and frequency variations over time
Fig. 4. System clock time synchronization performance
• Data required from testbed: Sensor data from PMUs and other
metering devices, accurate time measurements, packet-delay
measurements
• Collected results: Detection rate, stabilization time, accurate fine
grained supervision data from all phases
• Testbed requirements: Islanding capability, capability to invoke
failures and unstable situations without influencing the public
power grid, accurate clock synchronization, capability to combine
simulation, emulation and testbed devices
Experiment Set 2: behavior models
In this experiment set collected data will be used for the devel-
opment of models and training of model parameters for normal
grid operation. These models will provide the basis for predic-
tion methods and the detection of deviations from normal opera-
tion.
• Data required from testbed: Sensor data from several distributed
sensors, accurate time measurements from devices
• Collected Results: Grid behavior models and model parameters
• Testbed requirements: Capability to set different grid states, accu-
rate clock synchronization, capability to combine simulation, em-
ulation and testbed devices
Experiment Set 3: cross layer detection algorithms for cyber
security
In this set of experiments cross layer anomaly detection will be
tested. Anomalies can be caused by failures, misconfigurations or
by malicious attacks. For this, data is gathered from sensors, log
files, system data and network data from different layers in the FUSE
testbed and will be analyzed and correlated. Although physical at-
tacks are also possible, the FUSE project will first concentrate on
attacks on IT components and communication. Different scenarios
and use cases will be selected, including various IT infrastructure at-
tacks, such as Denial of Service, eavesdropping, data injection and
data modification. Since devices can always have undetected vulner-
abilities, we also assume zero-day exploits in the scenarios. The de-
tection quality and speed of different methods will be compared and
evaluated. Combined models for the detection of anomalies both in
communication network and electrical (micro)grids contribute signif-
icantly towards proactive planning and self-organizing energy net-
works.
• Data required from testbed: Sensor data from several distributed
sensors, log files from devices, network measurement data (differ-
ent layers), accurate time measurements
• Collected Results: Detection speed, detection quality
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• Testbed requirements: Islanding capability, capability to invoke
passive and active attacks (eavesdropping, man-in-the middle, de-
nial of service), capability to combine simulation, emulation and
testbed devices, accurate clock synchronization
In all three experiment sets, clock synchronization plays an essen-
tial role. It is needed to accurately monitor grid states and correlate
distributed information to achieve situational awareness across mul-
tiple devices. In real environments, it is unlikely to have accurate time
information available at all devices. In the FUSE testbed we equipped
devices with GPS clock sync and distribute network time protocol in-
formation in the local network. This makes it possible to establish a
fine grained view for situational awareness and to accurately corre-
late information from system logs, network measurements and grid
sensors.
In the current testbed (as of December 2016) the following com-
ponents have been already installed: a set of smart meters, a meter
data collector, a phasor measurement unit (PMU), a phasor data col-
lector (PDC), several GPS receivers with connections to servers and
PMU, hardware and software components for the sensor data col-
lection, including a storage solution and a data processing cluster.
Further PMUs and the interconnection of the components to further
equipment is currently in progress.
6. Initial experiments for testbed establishment
An experimental set up of a single PMU (Arbiter 1133A) has been
installed in the Institute of Telecommunications’ Cyber-Physical Sys-
tems (CPS) laboratory. Initially, the communication between the cor-
responding PMU and a computer was tested through PMU model
specific software. In the case of Ethernet connection, the proper-
ties of the communication can be alternated as far as the proto-
col is concerned (TCP/UDP), the number of frames per second, the
device ID and others. Live visualization of the measurements (volt-
age and current magnitudes and angles) as well as data storage is
possible. However, this serves only for the configuration, data vi-
sualization and storage of a single PMU device. For the scope of
the FUSE testbed, a Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC) is necessary,
which collects, visualizes, stores, aggregates and if needed sends
the data from multiple PMUs to further concentrators (e.g., Super
Phasor Data Concentrator, SPDC) or a central control center. Volt-
age and current phasors, frequency and statistical information (e.g.,
frames per second, time quality errors) are some of the data the
PMU sends to the PDC. For this purpose, the open source software
openPDC is deployed in the CPS laboratory. Data storage can be
configured through historian adapters for various output streams
that range from local comma separated value (CSV) files to remote
SQL databases and other storage options. Power output calculation
adapters are also provided by the software. Visualization of live mea-
surements is also enabled, Fig. 3.
The data collected from the PMU devices and smart meters will be
used as a basis for developing and investigating methods to detect
failures and attacks. The ability of the PMUs to measure synchro-
nized phasors with high resolution and accuracy enables not only
the investigation and development of algorithms, which can detect
slow evolving abnormal changes of metrics like, e.g., voltage mag-
nitude or phase, frequency and others, but also the analysis and
correlation of measurement data, which can only be realized in such
a testbed. Preliminary tests of the WAN emulator clock synchroniza-
tion performance on a 19′′ HP Proliant DL120G6 with Celeron 2.2
GHz CPU running Linux confirm the expected, satisfactory accuracy
as shown in Fig. 4. The results are based on the Network Time Proto-
col (NTP) daemon’s loopstats log file. Analysis of an exemplary cho-
sen weekly NTP log file for week 40, 2016, confirms that the system
clock is at any time within a window of ±20 µs to UTC. Moreover,
the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) in Fig. 4, right, illustrates
that 90 % of all system clock values stay within a narrow window
of 15 µs (±7.5 µs) to UTC.
7. Conclusion
The experimental FUSE microgrid facility is described and first exper-
imental installation of measurement equipment, data collecting and
storing are presented. Based on the collected data from measure-
ment equipment, methods and algorithms to detect anomalies both
in the electrical and the communication networks will be developed
and tested in the experimental facility. Security, timely data transfer
and reliability of communications will be evaluated in the testbed in
order to enhance situational-awareness as a step forward in evolving
grids into self-organizing networks.
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